Tales of Favicons and Caches: Persistent Tracking in Modern Browsers
https://www.cs.uic.edu/~polakis/papers/solomos-ndss21.pdf [www.cs.uic.edu]
2021-01-16 02:40
tags:
browser
opsec
paper
pdf
security
turtles
web
The privacy threats of online tracking have garnered considerable attention in recent years from researchers and practitioners alike. This has resulted in users becoming more privacy-cautious and browser vendors gradually adopting countermeasures to mitigate certain forms of cookie-based and cookie-less tracking. Nonetheless, the complexity and feature-rich nature of modern browsers often lead to the deployment of seemingly innocuous functionality that can be readily abused by adversaries. In this paper we introduce a novel tracking mechanism that misuses a simple yet ubiquitous browser feature: favicons. In more detail, a website can track users across browsing sessions by storing a tracking identifier as a set of entries in the browser’s dedicated favicon cache, where each entry corresponds to a specific subdomain. In subsequent user visits the website can reconstruct the identifier by observing which favicons are requested by the browser while the user is automatically and rapidly redirected through a series of subdomains. More importantly, the caching of favicons in modern browsers exhibits several unique characteristics that render this tracking vector particularly powerful, as it is persistent (not affected by users clearing their browser data), non-destructive (reconstructing the identifier in subsequent visits does not alter the existing combination of cached entries), and even crosses the isolation of the incognito mode. We experimentally evaluate several aspects of our attack, and present a series of optimization techniques that render our attack practical. We find that combining our favicon-based tracking technique with immutable browser-fingerprinting attributes that do not change over time allows a website to reconstruct a 32-bit tracking identifier in 2 seconds. Furthermore, our attack works in all major browsers that use a favicon cache, including Chrome and Safari. Due to the severity of our attack we propose changes to browsers’ favicon caching behavior that can prevent this form of tracking, and have disclosed our findings to browser vendors who are currently exploring appropriate mitigation strategies.
source: grugq
A Cryptologic Mystery
https://www.mattblaze.org/blog/neinnines/ [www.mattblaze.org]
2020-12-24 23:02
tags:
article
history
opsec
Did a broken random number generator in Cuba help expose a Russian espionage network?
I remember concluding that the most likely, if still rather improbable, explanation was that the 9-less messages were dummy fill traffic and that the random number generator used to create the messages had a bug or developed a defect that prevented 9s from being included. This would be, to say the least, a very serious error, since it would allow a listener to easily distinguish fill traffic from real traffic, completely negating the benefit of having fill traffic in the first place. It would open the door to exactly the kind of traffic analysis that the system was carefully engineered to thwart. The 9-less messages went on for almost ten years. (If I were reporting this as an Internet vulnerability, I would dub it the “Nein Nines” attack; please forgive the linguistic muddle). But I was resigned to the likelihood that I would never know for sure.
Data Security on Mobile Devices: Current State of the Art, Open Problems, and Proposed Solutions
http://securephones.io/ [securephones.io]
2020-12-24 21:38
tags:
android
iphone
opsec
paper
security
tech
In this work we attempt a full accounting of the current and historical status of smartphone security measures. We focus on several of the most popular device types, and present a complete description of both the available security mechanisms in these devices, as well as a summary of the known public information on the state-of-the-art in bypass techniques for each. Our goal is to provide a single periodically updated guide that serves to detail the public state of data security in modern smartphones.
source: green
Ok Google: please publish your DKIM secret keys
https://blog.cryptographyengineering.com/2020/11/16/ok-google-please-publish-your-dkim-secret-keys/ [blog.cryptographyengineering.com]
2020-12-11 06:27
tags:
admin
crypto
email
opsec
security
This post is about the situation with Domain Keys Identified Mail (DKIM), a harmless little spam protocol that has somehow become a monster. My request is simple and can be summarized as follows: Dear Google: would you mind rotating and publishing your DKIM secret keys on a periodic basis? This would make the entire Internet quite a bit more secure, by removing a strong incentive for criminals to steal and leak emails. The fix would cost you basically nothing, and would remove a powerful tool from hands of thieves.
source: green
This Tiny WiFi Camera Owns Kwikset SmartKey (LockTech LTKSD)
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=DGdsIrAjp3k [www.youtube.com]
2020-12-08 21:47
tags:
hardware
opsec
security
tech
video
Open a padlock (or probably any keyed lock) by taking a picture of the sliders inside, then cutting a key.
The video shows this in real time and is five minutes long. Open sesame!
Pictures from inside the German intelligence agency BND
https://www.electrospaces.net/2014/05/pictures-from-inside-german.html [www.electrospaces.net]
2020-05-24 18:25
tags:
hardware
history
opsec
photos
The German foreign intelligence service Bundesnachrichtendienst (BND) is moving to a brand new headquarters in Berlin. Here we show some unique pictures from inside the former headquarters in the village of Pullach and also give an impression of what the new building looks like.
source: grugq
TEMPEST@Home - Finding Radio Frequency Side Channels
https://duo.com/labs/research/finding-radio-sidechannels [duo.com]
2020-04-27 06:01
tags:
opsec
security
sidechannel
solder
wifi
As the test procedures in the TEMPEST standards are rudely made unavailable to us as they are considered “classified” we have to do the next best thing and make up our own. This article aims to make barely acceptable analogies about how radios work and show that you really don’t need that much in terms of know-how and equipment to find and take advantage of leaky radio signals. Towards the end, we will apply what we have learned to find a signal that can exfiltrate data out of a radio-less and air-gapped desktop workstation through a wall and 50ft away.
Dressing for the Surveillance Age
https://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2020/03/16/dressing-for-the-surveillance-age [www.newyorker.com]
2020-04-10 06:24
tags:
ai
hoipolloi
life
opsec
As cities become ever more packed with cameras that always see, public anonymity could disappear. Can stealth streetwear evade electronic eyes?
I liked this article because it at least acknowledged that these countermeasures are only a training data update away from becoming useless.
How to explain the KGB's amazing success identifying CIA agents in the field?
https://www.salon.com/2015/09/26/how_to_explain_the_kgbs_amazing_success_identifying_cia_agents_in_the_field/ [www.salon.com]
2020-03-25 01:16
tags:
history
opsec
Their argument was simple. How could these disasters have happened with such regularity if the agency had not been penetrated by Soviet moles? The problem with this line of thought was that it did not so much overestimate CIA security as underestimate the brainpower of their Russian counterparts.
source: grugq
Information Leaks via Safari's Intelligent Tracking Prevention
https://arxiv.org/abs/2001.07421 [arxiv.org]
2020-01-23 00:46
tags:
browser
iphone
mac
opsec
pdf
security
web
Intelligent Tracking Prevention (ITP) is a privacy mechanism implemented by Apple’s Safari browser, released in October 2017. ITP aims to reduce the cross-site tracking of web users by limiting the capabilities of cookies and other website data. As part of a routine security review, the Information Security Engineering team at Google has identified multiple security and privacy issues in Safari’s ITP design. These issues have a number of unexpected consequences, including the disclosure of the user’s web browsing habits, allowing persistent cross-site tracking, and enabling cross-site information leaks (including cross-site search). This report is a modestly expanded version of our original vulnerability submission to Apple (WebKit bug #201319), providing additional context and edited for clarity. A number of the issues discussed here have been addressed in Safari 13.0.4 and iOS 13.3, released in December 2019.
source: green
EASYCHAIR - CIA covert listening devices
https://www.cryptomuseum.com/covert/bugs/ec/index.htm [www.cryptomuseum.com]
2020-01-15 18:04
tags:
article
hardware
history
opsec
wifi
EASYCHAIR – also written as Easy Chair or EC – was the codename of a super secret research project, initiated by the US Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), aiming to develop covert listening devices (bugs) based on the principle of the Resonant Cavity Microphone – also known as The Great Seal Bug or The Thing – that had been found in 1952 in the study of the US ambassador’s residency in Moscow, hidden in a donated wooden carving of the Great Seal of the United States.
Upon discovery of The Thing, many US agencies – including the CIA – investigated the possibility of using the new – hitherto unknown – technology to its own advantage. The secret research took place in the Netherlands at the Dutch Radar Laboratory (NRP) in Noordwijk.
source: grugq
In Carlos Ghosn’s Escape, Plotters Exploited an Airport Security Hole
https://www.wsj.com/articles/plotters-exploited-airport-security-hole-in-ghosns-escape-11578270953 [www.wsj.com]
2020-01-06 18:06
tags:
flying
hoipolloi
opsec
Twelve Million Phones, One Dataset, Zero Privacy
https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2019/12/19/opinion/location-tracking-cell-phone.html [www.nytimes.com]
2019-12-20 23:43
tags:
android
best
investigation
iphone
opsec
tech
visualization
Every minute of every day, everywhere on the planet, dozens of companies — largely unregulated, little scrutinized — are logging the movements of tens of millions of people with mobile phones and storing the information in gigantic data files. The Times Privacy Project obtained one such file, by far the largest and most sensitive ever to be reviewed by journalists. It holds more than 50 billion location pings from the phones of more than 12 million Americans as they moved through several major cities, including Washington, New York, San Francisco and Los Angeles.
Each piece of information in this file represents the precise location of a single smartphone over a period of several months in 2016 and 2017. The data was provided to Times Opinion by sources who asked to remain anonymous because they were not authorized to share it and could face severe penalties for doing so. The sources of the information said they had grown alarmed about how it might be abused and urgently wanted to inform the public and lawmakers.
source: L
Finding the hotel room of a target
https://twitter.com/josephfcox/status/1201628379943964673 [twitter.com]
2019-12-03 04:20
tags:
opsec
tweet
wifi
War dial hotel WiFi login... Room number and last name login.
source: cox
Imagine Being on Trial. With Exonerating Evidence Trapped on Your Phone.
https://www.nytimes.com/2019/11/22/business/law-enforcement-public-defender-technology-gap.html [www.nytimes.com]
2019-11-25 01:39
tags:
android
hoipolloi
investigation
iphone
opsec
policy
tech
Public defenders lack access to gadgets and software that could keep their clients out of jail.
This tech gap has two basic forms. First, law enforcement agencies can use warrants and court orders to compel companies to turn over emails, photos and other communications, but defense lawyers have no such power. And second, the government has access to forensic technology that makes digital investigations easier. Over the last two decades, the machines and software designed to extract data from computers and smartphones were primarily made for and sold to law enforcement.
To successfully defend its clients, the Legal Aid Society, New York City’s largest public defender office, realized in 2013 that it needed to buy the same tools the police had: forensic devices and software from companies including Cellebrite, Magnet Forensics and Guidance Software. Not only does the expensive technology unearth digital evidence that is otherwise hard or impossible to find, it captures it in a format that can hold up in court, as opposed to evidence that could have been tampered with or forged.
source: green
Thirty years after the Berlin Wall fell, a Stasi spy puzzle remains unsolved
https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/thirty-years-after-the-berlin-wall-fell-no-end-in-sight-for-stasi-spy-puzzle/2019/11/01/160d8ae2-fb29-11e9-9e02-1d45cb3dfa8f_story.html [www.washingtonpost.com]
2019-11-09 19:22
tags:
history
investigation
opsec
In the aftermath of the fall of the Berlin Wall 30 years ago, East Germany’s secret police frantically tried to destroy millions of documents that laid bare the astounding reach of mass surveillance used to keep an iron grip on citizens.
As shredders that were available jammed or broke down, Stasi officers resorted to tearing the documents by hand, stuffing them into bags to later be burned or pulped. But the effort came to a premature halt when citizens groups stormed and occupied Stasi offices to preserve the evidence.
Three decades later, in the same rooms behind the foreboding gray facade of the former Stasi headquarters, Barbara Poenisch and nine fellow archivists are trying to piece those documents, and the history, back together.
Related: https://www.washingtonpost.com/history/2019/11/09/the-day-wall-came-down-how-post-covered-berlin-walls-fall-years-ago/
Light Commands
https://lightcommands.com/ [lightcommands.com]
2019-11-06 18:32
tags:
exploit
ioshit
opsec
paper
security
sidechannel
tech
Light Commands is a vulnerability of MEMS microphones that allows attackers to remotely inject inaudible and invisible commands into voice assistants, such as Google assistant, Amazon Alexa, Facebook Portal, and Apple Siri using light.
In our paper we demonstrate this effect, successfully using light to inject malicious commands into several voice controlled devices such as smart speakers, tablets, and phones across large distances and through glass windows.
source: grugq
I Got Access to My Secret Consumer Score. Now You Can Get Yours, Too.
https://www.nytimes.com/2019/11/04/business/secret-consumer-score-access.html [www.nytimes.com]
2019-11-04 17:06
tags:
business
life
opsec
Little-known companies are amassing your data — like food orders and Airbnb messages — and selling the analysis to clients. Here’s how to get a copy of what they have on you.
As of this summer, though, Sift does have a file on you, which it can produce upon request. I got mine, and I found it shocking: More than 400 pages long, it contained all the messages I’d ever sent to hosts on Airbnb; years of Yelp delivery orders; a log of every time I’d opened the Coinbase app on my iPhone. Many entries included detailed information about the device I used to do these things, including my IP address at the time.
source: HN
Inside the Phone Company Secretly Run By Drug Traffickers
https://www.vice.com/en_us/article/wjwbmm/inside-the-phone-company-secretly-run-by-drug-traffickers [www.vice.com]
2019-10-23 06:17
tags:
android
article
hoipolloi
opsec
All over the world, in Dutch clubs like the one Kok frequented, or Australian biker hangouts and Mexican drug safe houses, there is an underground trade of custom-engineered phones. These phones typically run software for sending encrypted emails or messages, and use their own server infrastructure for routing communications.
For MPC, the process of setting up the devices was relatively simple: MPC would take a Google Nexus 5 or Nexus 5X Android phone, and then add its own security features and operating system, according to social media posts from MPC and a source with knowledge of the process. MPC then created the customer’s messaging accounts, added a data-only SIM card (which MPC paid about £20 a month for), and then sold the phone to the customer at £1,200. Six-month renewals cost £700, the source added. MPC only sold around 5,000 phones, the source said, but that still indicates the business netted the company some £6 million. At one point, a version of MPC’s phones also used code from an open-source, security-focused Android fork called CopperheadOS, three sources said.
More: https://www.vice.com/en_us/article/kz4yxa/encrypted-phone-company-mpc-helped-martin-kok-murder
source: cox
Unexpected Norms Setters
https://cybersecpolitics.blogspot.com/2019/10/unexpected-norms-setters.html [cybersecpolitics.blogspot.com]
2019-10-19 22:10
tags:
malware
opsec
policy
I wanted to do a line by line review of Ilina Georgieva’s recent piece on cyber norms because on a brief read-through, I liked a lot of it. That said, the difficulty with reviewing policy pieces is you tend to think the ones that AGREE with you are naturally genius, which is not always the case. So after a more thorough review, there are a lot of serious issues with the piece and these are painfully listed below (if you happen to be Iliana).