Apocalypse-Proof - 33 Thomas Street
https://placesjournal.org/article/33-thomas-street-and-conspiracy-thrillers/ [placesjournal.org]
2023-09-18 00:10
tags:
architecture
article
history
movies
opsec
urban
A windowless telecommunications hub, 33 Thomas Street in New York City embodies an architecture of surveillance and paranoia. That has made it an ideal set for conspiracy thrillers.
When it was completed in Lower Manhattan in 1974, 33 Thomas Street, formerly known as the AT&T Long Lines Building, was intended as the world’s largest facility for connecting long-distance telephone calls. 1 Standing 532 feet — roughly equivalent to a 45-story building — it’s a mugshot for Brutalism, windowless and nearly featureless. Its only apertures are a series of ventilation hoods meant to hide microwave-satellite arrays, which communicate with ground-based relay stations and satellites in space. One of several long lines buildings designed by John Carl Warnecke for the New York Telephone Company, a subsidiary of AT&T, 33 Thomas Street is perhaps the most visually striking project in the architect’s long and influential career. Embodying postwar American economic and military hegemony, the tower broadcasts inscrutability and imperviousness. It was conceived, according to the architect, to be a “skyscraper inhabited by machines.”
source: HN
Exploiting aCropalypse: Recovering Truncated PNGs
https://www.da.vidbuchanan.co.uk/blog/exploiting-acropalypse.html [www.da.vidbuchanan.co.uk]
2023-03-18 19:40
tags:
android
compression
exploit
format
graphics
opsec
security
whoarethey: Determine Who Can Log In to an SSH Server
https://www.agwa.name/blog/post/whoarethey [www.agwa.name]
2023-01-11 04:12
tags:
networking
opsec
security
As a proof of concept, I’ve created whoarethey, a small Go program that takes the hostname:port of an SSH server, an SSH username, and a list of GitHub usernames, and prints out the GitHub username which is authorized to connect to the server.
source: HN
Lend Me Your Ear: Passive Remote Physical Side Channels on PCs
https://www.usenix.org/system/files/sec22summer_genkin.pdf [www.usenix.org]
2022-05-06 00:55
tags:
crypto
exploit
opsec
paper
pdf
security
sidechannel
systems
We show that built-in sensors in commodity PCs, such as microphones, inadvertently capture electromagnetic side-channel leakage from ongoing computation. Moreover, this information is often conveyed by supposedly-benign channels such as audio recordings and common Voice-over-IP applications, even after lossy compression.
We analyze the computation-dependent leakage captured by internal microphones, and empirically demonstrate its efficacy for attacks. In one scenario, an attacker steals the secret ECDSA signing keys of the counterparty in a voice call. In another, the attacker detects what web page their counterparty is loading. In the third scenario, a player in the Counter-Strike online multiplayer game can detect a hidden opponent waiting in ambush, by analyzing how the 3D rendering done by the opponent’s computer induces faint but detectable signals into the opponent’s audio feed.
‘Every message was copied to the police’: the inside story of the most daring surveillance sting in history
https://www.theguardian.com/australia-news/2021/sep/11/inside-story-most-daring-surveillance-sting-in-history [www.theguardian.com]
2021-09-22 21:51
tags:
opsec
policy
social
tech
Billed as the most secure phone on the planet, An0m became a viral sensation in the underworld. There was just one problem for anyone using it for criminal means: it was run by the police
source: HN
Recovering A Full Pem Private Key When Half Of It Is Redacted
https://blog.cryptohack.org/twitter-secrets [blog.cryptohack.org]
2021-03-25 02:26
tags:
crypto
math
opsec
programming
security
The @CryptoHack__ account was pinged today by ENOENT, with a CTF-like challenge found in the wild: Source tweet. Here’s a write-up covering how given a partially redacted PEM, the whole private key can be recovered. The Twitter user, SAXX, shared a partially redacted private RSA key in a tweet about a penetration test where they had recovered a private key. Precisely, a screenshot of a PEM was shared online with 31 of 51 total lines of the file redacted. As ENOENT correctly identified, the redaction they had offered wasn’t sufficient, and from the shared screenshot, it was possible to totally recover the private key.
source: L
Tales of Favicons and Caches: Persistent Tracking in Modern Browsers
https://www.cs.uic.edu/~polakis/papers/solomos-ndss21.pdf [www.cs.uic.edu]
2021-01-16 02:40
tags:
browser
opsec
paper
pdf
security
turtles
web
The privacy threats of online tracking have garnered considerable attention in recent years from researchers and practitioners alike. This has resulted in users becoming more privacy-cautious and browser vendors gradually adopting countermeasures to mitigate certain forms of cookie-based and cookie-less tracking. Nonetheless, the complexity and feature-rich nature of modern browsers often lead to the deployment of seemingly innocuous functionality that can be readily abused by adversaries. In this paper we introduce a novel tracking mechanism that misuses a simple yet ubiquitous browser feature: favicons. In more detail, a website can track users across browsing sessions by storing a tracking identifier as a set of entries in the browser’s dedicated favicon cache, where each entry corresponds to a specific subdomain. In subsequent user visits the website can reconstruct the identifier by observing which favicons are requested by the browser while the user is automatically and rapidly redirected through a series of subdomains. More importantly, the caching of favicons in modern browsers exhibits several unique characteristics that render this tracking vector particularly powerful, as it is persistent (not affected by users clearing their browser data), non-destructive (reconstructing the identifier in subsequent visits does not alter the existing combination of cached entries), and even crosses the isolation of the incognito mode. We experimentally evaluate several aspects of our attack, and present a series of optimization techniques that render our attack practical. We find that combining our favicon-based tracking technique with immutable browser-fingerprinting attributes that do not change over time allows a website to reconstruct a 32-bit tracking identifier in 2 seconds. Furthermore, our attack works in all major browsers that use a favicon cache, including Chrome and Safari. Due to the severity of our attack we propose changes to browsers’ favicon caching behavior that can prevent this form of tracking, and have disclosed our findings to browser vendors who are currently exploring appropriate mitigation strategies.
source: grugq
A Cryptologic Mystery
https://www.mattblaze.org/blog/neinnines/ [www.mattblaze.org]
2020-12-24 23:02
tags:
article
history
opsec
Did a broken random number generator in Cuba help expose a Russian espionage network?
I remember concluding that the most likely, if still rather improbable, explanation was that the 9-less messages were dummy fill traffic and that the random number generator used to create the messages had a bug or developed a defect that prevented 9s from being included. This would be, to say the least, a very serious error, since it would allow a listener to easily distinguish fill traffic from real traffic, completely negating the benefit of having fill traffic in the first place. It would open the door to exactly the kind of traffic analysis that the system was carefully engineered to thwart. The 9-less messages went on for almost ten years. (If I were reporting this as an Internet vulnerability, I would dub it the “Nein Nines” attack; please forgive the linguistic muddle). But I was resigned to the likelihood that I would never know for sure.
Data Security on Mobile Devices: Current State of the Art, Open Problems, and Proposed Solutions
http://securephones.io/ [securephones.io]
2020-12-24 21:38
tags:
android
iphone
opsec
paper
security
tech
In this work we attempt a full accounting of the current and historical status of smartphone security measures. We focus on several of the most popular device types, and present a complete description of both the available security mechanisms in these devices, as well as a summary of the known public information on the state-of-the-art in bypass techniques for each. Our goal is to provide a single periodically updated guide that serves to detail the public state of data security in modern smartphones.
source: green
Ok Google: please publish your DKIM secret keys
https://blog.cryptographyengineering.com/2020/11/16/ok-google-please-publish-your-dkim-secret-keys/ [blog.cryptographyengineering.com]
2020-12-11 06:27
tags:
admin
crypto
email
opsec
security
This post is about the situation with Domain Keys Identified Mail (DKIM), a harmless little spam protocol that has somehow become a monster. My request is simple and can be summarized as follows: Dear Google: would you mind rotating and publishing your DKIM secret keys on a periodic basis? This would make the entire Internet quite a bit more secure, by removing a strong incentive for criminals to steal and leak emails. The fix would cost you basically nothing, and would remove a powerful tool from hands of thieves.
source: green
This Tiny WiFi Camera Owns Kwikset SmartKey (LockTech LTKSD)
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=DGdsIrAjp3k [www.youtube.com]
2020-12-08 21:47
tags:
hardware
opsec
security
tech
video
Open a padlock (or probably any keyed lock) by taking a picture of the sliders inside, then cutting a key.
The video shows this in real time and is five minutes long. Open sesame!
Pictures from inside the German intelligence agency BND
https://www.electrospaces.net/2014/05/pictures-from-inside-german.html [www.electrospaces.net]
2020-05-24 18:25
tags:
hardware
history
opsec
photos
The German foreign intelligence service Bundesnachrichtendienst (BND) is moving to a brand new headquarters in Berlin. Here we show some unique pictures from inside the former headquarters in the village of Pullach and also give an impression of what the new building looks like.
source: grugq
TEMPEST@Home - Finding Radio Frequency Side Channels
https://duo.com/labs/research/finding-radio-sidechannels [duo.com]
2020-04-27 06:01
tags:
opsec
security
sidechannel
solder
wifi
As the test procedures in the TEMPEST standards are rudely made unavailable to us as they are considered “classified” we have to do the next best thing and make up our own. This article aims to make barely acceptable analogies about how radios work and show that you really don’t need that much in terms of know-how and equipment to find and take advantage of leaky radio signals. Towards the end, we will apply what we have learned to find a signal that can exfiltrate data out of a radio-less and air-gapped desktop workstation through a wall and 50ft away.
Dressing for the Surveillance Age
https://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2020/03/16/dressing-for-the-surveillance-age [www.newyorker.com]
2020-04-10 06:24
tags:
ai
hoipolloi
life
opsec
As cities become ever more packed with cameras that always see, public anonymity could disappear. Can stealth streetwear evade electronic eyes?
I liked this article because it at least acknowledged that these countermeasures are only a training data update away from becoming useless.
How to explain the KGB's amazing success identifying CIA agents in the field?
https://www.salon.com/2015/09/26/how_to_explain_the_kgbs_amazing_success_identifying_cia_agents_in_the_field/ [www.salon.com]
2020-03-25 01:16
tags:
history
opsec
Their argument was simple. How could these disasters have happened with such regularity if the agency had not been penetrated by Soviet moles? The problem with this line of thought was that it did not so much overestimate CIA security as underestimate the brainpower of their Russian counterparts.
source: grugq
Information Leaks via Safari's Intelligent Tracking Prevention
https://arxiv.org/abs/2001.07421 [arxiv.org]
2020-01-23 00:46
tags:
browser
iphone
mac
opsec
pdf
security
web
Intelligent Tracking Prevention (ITP) is a privacy mechanism implemented by Apple’s Safari browser, released in October 2017. ITP aims to reduce the cross-site tracking of web users by limiting the capabilities of cookies and other website data. As part of a routine security review, the Information Security Engineering team at Google has identified multiple security and privacy issues in Safari’s ITP design. These issues have a number of unexpected consequences, including the disclosure of the user’s web browsing habits, allowing persistent cross-site tracking, and enabling cross-site information leaks (including cross-site search). This report is a modestly expanded version of our original vulnerability submission to Apple (WebKit bug #201319), providing additional context and edited for clarity. A number of the issues discussed here have been addressed in Safari 13.0.4 and iOS 13.3, released in December 2019.
source: green
EASYCHAIR - CIA covert listening devices
https://www.cryptomuseum.com/covert/bugs/ec/index.htm [www.cryptomuseum.com]
2020-01-15 18:04
tags:
article
hardware
history
opsec
wifi
EASYCHAIR – also written as Easy Chair or EC – was the codename of a super secret research project, initiated by the US Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), aiming to develop covert listening devices (bugs) based on the principle of the Resonant Cavity Microphone – also known as The Great Seal Bug or The Thing – that had been found in 1952 in the study of the US ambassador’s residency in Moscow, hidden in a donated wooden carving of the Great Seal of the United States.
Upon discovery of The Thing, many US agencies – including the CIA – investigated the possibility of using the new – hitherto unknown – technology to its own advantage. The secret research took place in the Netherlands at the Dutch Radar Laboratory (NRP) in Noordwijk.
source: grugq
In Carlos Ghosn’s Escape, Plotters Exploited an Airport Security Hole
https://www.wsj.com/articles/plotters-exploited-airport-security-hole-in-ghosns-escape-11578270953 [www.wsj.com]
2020-01-06 18:06
tags:
flying
hoipolloi
opsec
Twelve Million Phones, One Dataset, Zero Privacy
https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2019/12/19/opinion/location-tracking-cell-phone.html [www.nytimes.com]
2019-12-20 23:43
tags:
android
best
investigation
iphone
opsec
tech
visualization
Every minute of every day, everywhere on the planet, dozens of companies — largely unregulated, little scrutinized — are logging the movements of tens of millions of people with mobile phones and storing the information in gigantic data files. The Times Privacy Project obtained one such file, by far the largest and most sensitive ever to be reviewed by journalists. It holds more than 50 billion location pings from the phones of more than 12 million Americans as they moved through several major cities, including Washington, New York, San Francisco and Los Angeles.
Each piece of information in this file represents the precise location of a single smartphone over a period of several months in 2016 and 2017. The data was provided to Times Opinion by sources who asked to remain anonymous because they were not authorized to share it and could face severe penalties for doing so. The sources of the information said they had grown alarmed about how it might be abused and urgently wanted to inform the public and lawmakers.
source: L
Finding the hotel room of a target
https://twitter.com/josephfcox/status/1201628379943964673 [twitter.com]
2019-12-03 04:20
tags:
opsec
tweet
wifi
War dial hotel WiFi login... Room number and last name login.
source: cox