Don't touch my clipboard
> You can (but shouldn’t) change how people copy text from your website.
Don't touch my clipboard
> You can (but shouldn’t) change how people copy text from your website.
Escaping the Chrome Sandbox with RIDL
> Vulnerabilities that leak cross process memory can be exploited to escape the Chrome sandbox. An attacker is still required to compromise the renderer prior to mounting this attack. To protect against attacks on affected CPUs make sure your microcode is up to date and disable hyper-threading (HT).
This is a pretty clear write-up and comes with a nice footnote:
> When I started working on this I was surprised that it’s still exploitable even though the vulnerabilities have been public for a while. If you read guidance on the topic, they will usually talk about how these vulnerabilities have been mitigated if your OS is up to date with a note that you should disable hyper threading to protect yourself fully. The focus on mitigations certainly gave me a false sense that the vulnerabilities have been addressed and I think these articles could be more clear on the impact of leaving hyper threading enabled.
Information Leaks via Safari's Intelligent Tracking Prevention
> Intelligent Tracking Prevention (ITP) is a privacy mechanism implemented by Apple’s Safari browser, released in October 2017. ITP aims to reduce the cross-site tracking of web users by limiting the capabilities of cookies and other website data. As part of a routine security review, the Information Security Engineering team at Google has identified multiple security and privacy issues in Safari’s ITP design. These issues have a number of unexpected consequences, including the disclosure of the user’s web browsing habits, allowing persistent cross-site tracking, and enabling cross-site information leaks (including cross-site search). This report is a modestly expanded version of our original vulnerability submission to Apple (WebKit bug #201319), providing additional context and edited for clarity. A number of the issues discussed here have been addressed in Safari 13.0.4 and iOS 13.3, released in December 2019.
The Curious Case of WebCrypto Diffie-Hellman on Firefox - Small Subgroups Key Recovery Attack on DH
> Mozilla Firefox prior to version 72 suffers from Small Subgroups Key Recovery Attack on DH in the WebCrypto’s API. The Firefox’s team fixed the issue removing completely support for DH over finite fields (that is not in the WebCrypto standard). If you find this interesting read further below.
Real-world measurements of structured-lattices and supersingular isogenies in TLS
> This is the third in a series of posts about running experiments on post-quantum confidentiality in TLS. The first detailed experiments that measured the estimated network overhead of three families of post-quantum key exchanges. The second detailed the choices behind a specific structured-lattice scheme. This one gives details of a full, end-to-end measurement of that scheme and a supersingular isogeny scheme, SIKE/p434. This was done in collaboration with Cloudflare, who integrated Microsoft’s SIKE code into BoringSSL for the tests, and ran the server-side of the experiment.
> Because optimised assembly implementations are labour-intensive to write, they were only available/written for AArch64 and x86-64. Because SIKE is computationally expensive, it wasn’t feasible to enable it without an assembly implementation, thus only AArch64 and x86-64 clients were included in the experiment and ARMv7 and x86 clients did not contribute to the results even if they were assigned to one of the experiment groups.
Dramatically reduced power usage in Firefox 70 on macOS with Core Animation
> In Firefox 70 we changed how pixels get to the screen on macOS. This allows us to do less work per frame when only small parts of the screen change. As a result, Firefox 70 drastically reduces the power usage during browsing.
> Every Firefox window contains one OpenGL context, which covers the entire window. Firefox 69 was using the API described above. So we were always redrawing the whole window on every change, and the window manager was always copying our entire window to the screen on every change. This turned out to be a problem despite the fact that these draws were fully hardware accelerated.
> Core Animation is the name of an Apple framework which lets you create a tree of layers (CALayer). These layers usually contain textures with some pixel content. The layer tree defines the positions, sizes, and order of the layers within the window. Starting with macOS 10.14, all windows use Core Animation by default, as a way to share their rendering with the window manager.
Remote Code Execution in Firefox beyond memory corruptions
> Browsers are complicated enough to have attack surface beyond memory safety issues. This talk will look into injection flaws in the user interface of Mozilla Firefox, which is implemented in JS, HTML, and an XML-dialect called XUL. With an Cross-Site Scripting (XSS) in the user interface attackers can execute arbitrary code in the context of the main browser application process. This allows for cross-platform exploits of high reliability. The talk discusses past vulnerabilities and will also suggest mitigations that benefit Single Page Applications and other platforms that may suffer from DOM-based XSS, like Electron.
HTTP Mock – Intercept, debug and mock HTTP
> HTTP Mock is the latest tool in HTTP Toolkit, a suite of beautiful & open-source tools for debugging, testing and building with HTTP(S), on Windows, Linux & Mac.
This does look useful.
Interesting implementation note: https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=21072087
> The trick is that it starts the application to be intercepted for you, so it can control it a little. It then does some magic to get that specific instance of the application to trust the certificate. There’s a lot going on there, but as an example: Chrome has a --ignore-certificate-errors-spki-list to inject the hashes of extra CAs that can be trusted in this specific Chrome instance. When HTTP Toolkit starts a Chrome process, it adds that command line option, with the hash of your locally generated CA.
Ik spreek geen Nederlands
> As you can see, the text was (for reasons unknown to me) helpfully translated into the language of the country we happen to be in. Unfortunately I don’t speak either Dutch or Portuguese so I can only interpret this behaviour as a punishment encountered by people rude enough to dare travel abroad without learning the language spoken in the country they happen to be in, thereby breaking the worldview held by the particular programmer who happened to be responsible for creating the translation module for this amazing example of good web development practices.
Public Suffix List Problems
> This is a collection of thoughts from a maintainer of the Public Suffix List (PSL) about the importance of avoiding new Web Platform features, security, or privacy boundaries assuming the PSL is a good starting point.
> Equally terrifying, however, is how many providers only discovered the existence of the PSL once LE was using it to rate limit - meaning that their users were able to influence cookies and other storage without restriction, until an incidental change (wanting to get more certs) caused the server operator to realize.
The Baseline Interpreter: a faster JS interpreter in Firefox 70
> The Baseline Interpreter sits between the C++ interpreter and the Baseline JIT and has elements from both. It executes all bytecode instructions with a fixed interpreter loop (like the C++ interpreter). In addition, it uses Inline Caches to improve performance and collect type information (like the Baseline JIT).
A very deep dive into iOS Exploit chains found in the wild
> Earlier this year Google’s Threat Analysis Group (TAG) discovered a small collection of hacked websites. The hacked sites were being used in indiscriminate watering hole attacks against their visitors, using iPhone 0-day.
> There was no target discrimination; simply visiting the hacked site was enough for the exploit server to attack your device, and if it was successful, install a monitoring implant. We estimate that these sites receive thousands of visitors per week.
> TAG was able to collect five separate, complete and unique iPhone exploit chains, covering almost every version from iOS 10 through to the latest version of iOS 12. This indicated a group making a sustained effort to hack the users of iPhones in certain communities over a period of at least two years.
> I’ll investigate what I assess to be the root causes of the vulnerabilities and discuss some insights we can gain into Apple’s software development lifecycle. The root causes I highlight here are not novel and are often overlooked: we’ll see cases of code which seems to have never worked, code that likely skipped QA or likely had little testing or review before being shipped to users.
Spying on HTTPS
> While most users probably would have no idea what to make of this, I happened to know what it means– Chrome is warning me that the system configuration has instructed it to leak the secret keys it uses to encrypt and decrypt HTTPS traffic to a stream on the local computer.
High-performance input handling on the web
> There is a class of UI performance problems that arise from the following situation: An input event is firing faster than the browser can paint frames.
> In a previous post, I discussed Lodash’s debounce and throttle functions, which I find very useful for these kinds of situations. Recently however, I found a pattern I like even better, so I want to discuss that here.
Google and Mozilla are failing to support browser extension developers
> It is a regular occurrence to hear about open source developers selling their browser extensions, only for their users to be exploited later on by the new owners.
One of the reasons I’m wary of extensions. Least audited and least controlled code delivery mechanism for many systems.
Adblocking: How About Nah?
> The rise and rise of ad-blockers (and ad-blocker-blocker-blockers) is without parallel: 26% of Internet users are now blocking ads, and the figure is rising. It’s been called the biggest boycott in human history.
> Adversarial interoperability occurs when someone figures out how to plug a new product or service into an existing product or service, against the wishes of the company behind that existing product or service.
Plus a history of ads on the web.
Getting Into Browser Exploitation
Last post in series, toc at the top.
> 0x00: New Series: Getting Into Browser Exploitation
> 0x02: The Butterfly of JSObject
> 0x04: WebKit RegExp Exploit addrof() walk-through
> 0x05: The fakeobj() Primitive: Turning an Address Leak into a Memory Corruption
> 0x07: Preparing for Stage 2 of a WebKit exploit
> 0x08: Arbitrary Read and Write in WebKit Exploit
The Mutable Web
> This is my question: why do we put up with websites that we don’t like looking at? I think most people would answer that question with another question: What choice do we have?
DataSpii: The catastrophic data leak via browser extensions
> Our investigation uncovered an online service selling the collected browsing activity data to its subscription members in near real-time. In this report, we delineate the sensitive data source types relevant to the security of individuals and businesses across the globe. We observed two extensions employing dilatory tactics — an effective maneuver for eluding detection — to collect the data. We identified the collection of sensitive data from the internal network environments of Fortune 500 companies.
Browers can't feasibly stop web pages from talking to private (local) IP addresses
> This is a tempting and natural viewpoint, but unfortunately this can’t be done in practice without breaking things. To understand this, I’ll outline a series of approaches and then explain why they fail or cause problems.