In response to Australia’s proposed new Media Bargaining law, Facebook will restrict publishers and people in Australia from sharing or viewing Australian and international news content.

I tested how the 1000 most popular Chrome extensions affect browser performance. The main metrics I’ll consider are CPU consumption, memory consumption, and whether the extension makes pages render more slowly.

Some results are terrible. Some are worse.

source: HN

This means there is a variety of servers and clients, which might have different views on request boundaries, creating opportunities for desynchronization attacks (a.k.a. HTTP Desync). It might seem simple to follow the latest RFC recommendations. However, for large scale systems that have been there for a while, it may come with unacceptable availability impact.

http_desync_guardian library is designed to analyze HTTP requests to prevent HTTP Desync attacks, balancing security and availability. It classifies requests into different categories and provides recommendations on how each tier should be handled.

The privacy threats of online tracking have garnered considerable attention in recent years from researchers and practitioners alike. This has resulted in users becoming more privacy-cautious and browser vendors gradually adopting countermeasures to mitigate certain forms of cookie-based and cookie-less tracking. Nonetheless, the complexity and feature-rich nature of modern browsers often lead to the deployment of seemingly innocuous functionality that can be readily abused by adversaries. In this paper we introduce a novel tracking mechanism that misuses a simple yet ubiquitous browser feature: favicons. In more detail, a website can track users across browsing sessions by storing a tracking identifier as a set of entries in the browser’s dedicated favicon cache, where each entry corresponds to a specific subdomain. In subsequent user visits the website can reconstruct the identifier by observing which favicons are requested by the browser while the user is automatically and rapidly redirected through a series of subdomains. More importantly, the caching of favicons in modern browsers exhibits several unique characteristics that render this tracking vector particularly powerful, as it is persistent (not affected by users clearing their browser data), non-destructive (reconstructing the identifier in subsequent visits does not alter the existing combination of cached entries), and even crosses the isolation of the incognito mode. We experimentally evaluate several aspects of our attack, and present a series of optimization techniques that render our attack practical. We find that combining our favicon-based tracking technique with immutable browser-fingerprinting attributes that do not change over time allows a website to reconstruct a 32-bit tracking identifier in 2 seconds. Furthermore, our attack works in all major browsers that use a favicon cache, including Chrome and Safari. Due to the severity of our attack we propose changes to browsers’ favicon caching behavior that can prevent this form of tracking, and have disclosed our findings to browser vendors who are currently exploring appropriate mitigation strategies.

source: grugq

KEMTLS, therefore, achieves the same goals as TLS 1.3 (authentication, confidentiality and integrity) in the face of quantum computers. But there’s one small difference compared to the TLS 1.3 handshake. KEMTLS allows the client to send encrypted application data in the second client-to-server TLS message flow when client authentication is not required, and in the third client-to-server TLS message flow when mutual authentication is required. Note that with TLS 1.3, the server is able to send encrypted and authenticated application data in its first response message (although, in most uses of TLS 1.3, this feature is not actually used). With KEMTLS, when client authentication is not required, the client is able to send its first encrypted application data after the same number of handshake round trips as in TLS 1.3.

Intuitively, the handshake signature in TLS 1.3 proves possession of the private key corresponding to the public key certified in the TLS 1.3 server certificate. For these signature schemes, this is the straightforward way to prove possession; another way to prove possession is through key exchanges. By carefully considering the key derivation sequence, a server can decrypt any messages sent by the client only if it holds the private key corresponding to the certified public key. Therefore, implicit authentication is fulfilled. It is worth noting that KEMTLS still relies on signatures by certificate authorities to authenticate the long-term KEM keys.

This is a writeup of a vulnerability I found in Chromium and Firefox that could allow a malicious page to read some parts of an image located on an origin it is not supposed to be able to access. Although technically interesting, it is quite limited in scope—I am not aware of any major websites it could’ve been used against. As of November 17th, 2020, the vulnerability has been fixed in the most recent versions of both browsers.

The time that it takes CanvasRenderingContext2D.drawImage to draw a pixel depends on whether it is fully transparent, opaque, or semi-transparent. By timing a bunch of calls to drawImage, we can reliably infer the transparency of each pixel in a cross-origin image, which is enough to, for example, read text on a transparent background, like this:

source: HN

Section 230 had such a drama-filled year that I decided to do a separate roundup, in addition to my annual Internet Law wrapup coming soon. (I know 2020 feels like it was a decade ago…) Trigger warning: this post is a shitshow.

I quickly Googled “base64 to image”, and pasted the base64 into the first decoder I found, and it displayed a thumbnail from the target Private video! It worked! I have found a working IDOR (Insecure Direct Object Reference) bug, where I could get a frame from any private video on YouTube!

source: HN

NAT Slipstreaming allows an attacker to remotely access any TCP/UDP service bound to a victim machine, bypassing the victim’s NAT/firewall (arbitrary firewall pinhole control), just by the victim visiting a website.

This is neat, although you have to dig in a bit to learn it requires the NAT gateway to do some fancy SIP proxying.

source: L

This statement bears some resemblance to Justice Thomas’ statement in early 2019 that the Supreme Court should reconsider the actual malice standard from New York Times v. Sullivan. Like this statement, that statement was anti-media, pro-censorship, and quite unpersuasive. So far, the Supreme Court hasn’t taken up Justice Thomas’ initiative against the actual malice standard. I hope this statement suffers the same fate.

AVIF is a new image format derived from the keyframes of AV1 video. It’s a royalty-free format, and it’s already supported in Chrome 85 on desktop. Android support will be added soon, Firefox is working on an implementation, and although it took Safari 10 years to add WebP support, I don’t think we’ll see the same delay here, as Apple are a member of the group that created AV1.

Roughly speaking, at an acceptable quality, the WebP is almost half the size of JPEG, and AVIF is under half the size of WebP. I find it incredible that AVIF can do a good job of the image in just 18 kB.

source: L

Certificate Transparency (CT) is a still-evolving technology for detecting incorrectly issued certificates on the web. It’s cool and interesting, but complicated. I’ve given talks about CT, I’ve worked on Chrome’s CT implementation, and I’m actively involved in tackling ongoing deployment challenges – even so, I still sometimes lose track of how the pieces fit together. I find it easy to forget how the system defends against particular attacks, or what the purpose of some particular mechanism is.

source: green

Every time there is another JWS/JWT vulnerability involving “alg“:“none” (like today, lolsob), people focus on the “none” part. But the real problem is the “alg” part.

source: white

In short, I enjoy and appreciate The Times. And after paying over $300 a year for nearly a decade, and having read the Times on a near-daily basis for my entire adult life, I feel I qualify as a good customer. And they repay me by deliberately annoying me several times a day, every day, when I attempt to read the product I’m paying them for. How could one not find this outrageously annoying?

source: DF

This post highlights a few powerful lines of CSS that do some serious heavy lifting and help you build robust modern layouts.

source: L

Obviously, to do stuff like this, you need to generate certificates. The reasonable way to do that in 2020 is with LetsEncrypt. We do that for our users automatically, but “it just works” makes for a pretty boring writeup, so let’s see how complicated and meandering I can make this.

It’s time to talk about certificate infrastructure.

source: L

I think Google’s result of 25-34% smaller files is mostly caused by the fact that they compared their WebP encoder to the JPEG reference implementation, Independent JPEG Group’s cjpeg, not Mozilla’s improved MozJPEG encoder. I decided to run some tests to see how cjpeg, MozJPEG and WebP compare. I also tested the new AVIF format, based on the open AV1 video codec. AVIF support is already in Firefox behind a flag and should be coming soon to Chrome if this ticket is to be believed.

source: HN

It is clear that it is still painful to develop a website or web app that works reliably across browsers.

source: HN

A lot of stuff on the Internet is currently broken on account of a Sectigo root certificate expiring at 10:48:38 UTC today. Generally speaking, this is affecting older, non-browser clients (notably OpenSSL 1.0.x) which talk to TLS servers which serve a Sectigo certificate chain ending in the expired certificate. See also this Twitter thread by Ryan Sleevi.

https://twitter.com/sleevi_/status/1266647545675210753

source: HN

In the month of April, I found a zero-day in Sign in with Apple that affected third-party applications which were using it and didn’t implement their own additional security measures. This bug could have resulted in a full account takeover of user accounts on that third party application irrespective of a victim having a valid Apple ID or not.

source: HN