Exploiting vulnerabilities in Cellebrite UFED and Physical Analyzer from an app's perspective
https://signal.org/blog/cellebrite-vulnerabilities/ [signal.org]
2021-04-21 20:18
tags:
android
defense
exploit
iphone
security
social
storage
As just one example (unrelated to what follows), their software bundles FFmpeg DLLs that were built in 2012 and have not been updated since then. There have been over a hundred security updates in that time, none of which have been applied.
In completely unrelated news, upcoming versions of Signal will be periodically fetching files to place in app storage. These files are never used for anything inside Signal and never interact with Signal software or data, but they look nice, and aesthetics are important in software. Files will only be returned for accounts that have been active installs for some time already, and only probabilistically in low percentages based on phone number sharding. We have a few different versions of files that we think are aesthetically pleasing, and will iterate through those slowly over time. There is no other significance to these files.
Security Analysis Of AMD Predictive Store Forwarding
https://www.amd.com/system/files/documents/security-analysis-predictive-store-forwarding.pdf [www.amd.com]
2021-04-03 02:38
tags:
cpu
pdf
perf
programming
security
sidechannel
AMD “Zen3” processors feature a new technology called Predictive Store Forwarding (PSF). PSF is a hardware-based micro-architectural optimization designed to improve the performance of code execution by predicting dependencies between loads and stores. Like technologies such as branch prediction, with PSF the processor “guesses” what the result of a load is likely to be, and speculatively executes subsequent instructions. In the event that the processor incorrectly speculated on the result of the load, it is designed to detect this and flush the incorrect results from the CPU pipeline.
Security research in recent years has examined the security implications of incorrect CPU speculation and how in some cases it may lead to side channel attacks. For instance, conditional branch speculation, indirect branch speculation, and store bypass speculation have been demonstrated to have the potential to be used in side-channel attacks (e.g., Spectre v1, v2, and v4 respectively).
Nice disclosure.
source: R
This Man Thought Opening a TXT File Is Fine, He Thought Wrong. MacOS CVE-2019-8761
https://www.paulosyibelo.com/2021/04/this-man-thought-opening-txt-file-is.html [www.paulosyibelo.com]
2021-04-03 00:44
tags:
exploit
html
mac
security
text
turtles
This research originated when I realized the default text reader on OSX, TextEdit is used to open files with TXT extension by default. On the interface of TextEdit, it looked like you can do basic customization to your text (you can turn text bold, italic, change color etc...), so I was wondering how a TXT file was storing and parsing this information. It seems it uses RTF format instead of TXT if we add customizations to the text.
source: HN
Recovering A Full Pem Private Key When Half Of It Is Redacted
https://blog.cryptohack.org/twitter-secrets [blog.cryptohack.org]
2021-03-25 02:26
tags:
crypto
math
opsec
programming
security
The @CryptoHack__ account was pinged today by ENOENT, with a CTF-like challenge found in the wild: Source tweet. Here’s a write-up covering how given a partially redacted PEM, the whole private key can be recovered. The Twitter user, SAXX, shared a partially redacted private RSA key in a tweet about a penetration test where they had recovered a private key. Precisely, a screenshot of a PEM was shared online with 31 of 51 total lines of the file redacted. As ENOENT correctly identified, the redaction they had offered wasn’t sufficient, and from the shared screenshot, it was possible to totally recover the private key.
source: L
Wrecking sandwich traders for fun and profit
https://github.com/Defi-Cartel/salmonella [github.com]
2021-03-19 18:19
tags:
blockchain
finance
programming
security
However, nothing is risk-free on the blockchain, and exploitative trading strategies such as sandwich trading and front-running actually increase in risk the more the engineer attempts to generalise their ability to capture opportunities.
To illustrate to novice traders the risks of playing in the mempool, I have conducted a demonstration of a new trading alpha I call “Salmonella”, which involves intentionally exploiting the generalised nature of front-running setups. The goal of sandwich trading is to exploit the slippage of unintended victims, so this strategy turns the tables on the exploiters.
source: HN
Lord of the Ring(s): Side Channel Attacks on the CPU On-Chip Ring Interconnect Are Practical
https://arxiv.org/abs/2103.03443 [arxiv.org]
2021-03-08 18:36
tags:
cpu
exploit
paper
security
sidechannel
We introduce the first microarchitectural side channel attacks that leverage contention on the CPU ring interconnect. There are two challenges that make it uniquely difficult to exploit this channel. First, little is known about the ring interconnect’s functioning and architecture. Second, information that can be learned by an attacker through ring contention is noisy by nature and has coarse spatial granularity. To address the first challenge, we perform a thorough reverse engineering of the sophisticated protocols that handle communication on the ring interconnect. With this knowledge, we build a cross-core covert channel over the ring interconnect with a capacity of over 4 Mbps from a single thread, the largest to date for a cross-core channel not relying on shared memory. To address the second challenge, we leverage the fine-grained temporal patterns of ring contention to infer a victim program’s secrets. We demonstrate our attack by extracting key bits from vulnerable EdDSA and RSA implementations, as well as inferring the precise timing of keystrokes typed by a victim user.
source: HN
An Exploration of JSON Interoperability Vulnerabilities
https://labs.bishopfox.com/tech-blog/an-exploration-of-json-interoperability-vulnerabilities [labs.bishopfox.com]
2021-02-26 22:29
tags:
format
javascript
security
standard
text
turtles
The same JSON document can be parsed with different values across microservices, leading to a variety of potential security risks. If you prefer a hands-on approach, try the labs and when they scare you, come back and read on.
https://github.com/BishopFox/json-interop-vuln-labs/
source: HN
In-depth dive into the security features of the Intel/Windows platform secure boot process
https://igor-blue.github.io/2021/02/04/secure-boot.html [igor-blue.github.io]
2021-02-15 18:19
tags:
bios
cpu
hardware
security
systems
windows
This blog post is an in-depth dive into the security features of the Intel/Windows platform boot process. In this post I’ll explain the startup process through security focused lenses, next post we’ll dive into several known attacks and how there were handled by Intel and Microsoft. My wish is to explain to technology professionals not deep into platform security why Microsoft’s SecureCore is so important and necessary.
Not exclusive to Windows systems, lots of PC platform details.
source: grugq
Dependency Confusion: How I Hacked Into Apple, Microsoft and Dozens of Other Companies
https://medium.com/@alex.birsan/dependency-confusion-4a5d60fec610 [medium.com]
2021-02-11 14:14
tags:
development
exploit
security
turtles
A Look at iMessage in iOS 14
https://googleprojectzero.blogspot.com/2021/01/a-look-at-imessage-in-ios-14.html [googleprojectzero.blogspot.com]
2021-01-29 00:17
tags:
defense
development
iphone
security
The blog post will start with an overview of the major changes Apple implemented in iOS 14 which affect the security of iMessage. Afterwards, and mostly for the readers interested in the technical details, each of the major improvements is described in more detail while also providing a walkthrough of how it was reverse engineered. At least for the technical details, it is recommended to briefly review the blog post series from last year for a basic introduction to iMessage and the exploitation techniques used to attack it.
This approach could apply to any system.
KindleDrip — From Your Kindle’s Email Address to Using Your Credit Card
https://medium.com/realmodelabs/kindledrip-from-your-kindles-email-address-to-using-your-credit-card-bb93dbfb2a08 [medium.com]
2021-01-22 04:16
tags:
email
exploit
ioshit
malware
security
Some time ago, we noticed at Realmode Labs that Amazon Kindle has an interesting feature called “Send to Kindle”. This feature allows Kindle users to send e-books to their device as email attachments. We immediately thought of the potential security concerns of this feature: what if we can send malicious e-books to unsuspecting users?
source: R
http desync guardian
https://github.com/aws/http-desync-guardian [github.com]
2021-01-20 07:06
tags:
defense
library
security
web
This means there is a variety of servers and clients, which might have different views on request boundaries, creating opportunities for desynchronization attacks (a.k.a. HTTP Desync). It might seem simple to follow the latest RFC recommendations. However, for large scale systems that have been there for a while, it may come with unacceptable availability impact.
http_desync_guardian library is designed to analyze HTTP requests to prevent HTTP Desync attacks, balancing security and availability. It classifies requests into different categories and provides recommendations on how each tier should be handled.
BitLocker Lockscreen bypass
https://secret.club/2021/01/15/bitlocker-bypass.html [secret.club]
2021-01-18 00:41
tags:
auth
exploit
security
turtles
windows
BitLocker is a modern data protection feature that is deeply integrated in the Windows kernel. It is used by many corporations as a means of protecting company secrets in case of theft. Microsoft recommends that you have a Trusted Platform Module which can do some of the heavy cryptographic lifting for you.
If we smash shift 5 times in quick succession, a link to open the Settings app appears, and the link actually works. We cannot see the launched Settings app. Giving the launched app focus is slightly tricky; you have to click the link and then click a place where the launched app would be visible with the correct timing. The easiest way to learn to do it is, keep clicking the link roughly 2 times a second. The sticky keys windows will disappear. Keep clicking! You will now see a focus box is drawn in the middle of the screen. That was the Settings app, and you have to stop clicking when it gets focus.
Accessibility UX wins again.
source: HN
Tales of Favicons and Caches: Persistent Tracking in Modern Browsers
https://www.cs.uic.edu/~polakis/papers/solomos-ndss21.pdf [www.cs.uic.edu]
2021-01-16 02:40
tags:
browser
opsec
paper
pdf
security
turtles
web
The privacy threats of online tracking have garnered considerable attention in recent years from researchers and practitioners alike. This has resulted in users becoming more privacy-cautious and browser vendors gradually adopting countermeasures to mitigate certain forms of cookie-based and cookie-less tracking. Nonetheless, the complexity and feature-rich nature of modern browsers often lead to the deployment of seemingly innocuous functionality that can be readily abused by adversaries. In this paper we introduce a novel tracking mechanism that misuses a simple yet ubiquitous browser feature: favicons. In more detail, a website can track users across browsing sessions by storing a tracking identifier as a set of entries in the browser’s dedicated favicon cache, where each entry corresponds to a specific subdomain. In subsequent user visits the website can reconstruct the identifier by observing which favicons are requested by the browser while the user is automatically and rapidly redirected through a series of subdomains. More importantly, the caching of favicons in modern browsers exhibits several unique characteristics that render this tracking vector particularly powerful, as it is persistent (not affected by users clearing their browser data), non-destructive (reconstructing the identifier in subsequent visits does not alter the existing combination of cached entries), and even crosses the isolation of the incognito mode. We experimentally evaluate several aspects of our attack, and present a series of optimization techniques that render our attack practical. We find that combining our favicon-based tracking technique with immutable browser-fingerprinting attributes that do not change over time allows a website to reconstruct a 32-bit tracking identifier in 2 seconds. Furthermore, our attack works in all major browsers that use a favicon cache, including Chrome and Safari. Due to the severity of our attack we propose changes to browsers’ favicon caching behavior that can prevent this form of tracking, and have disclosed our findings to browser vendors who are currently exploring appropriate mitigation strategies.
source: grugq
KEMTLS: Post-quantum TLS without signatures
https://blog.cloudflare.com/kemtls-post-quantum-tls-without-signatures/ [blog.cloudflare.com]
2021-01-16 02:37
tags:
beta
crypto
networking
quantum
security
web
KEMTLS, therefore, achieves the same goals as TLS 1.3 (authentication, confidentiality and integrity) in the face of quantum computers. But there’s one small difference compared to the TLS 1.3 handshake. KEMTLS allows the client to send encrypted application data in the second client-to-server TLS message flow when client authentication is not required, and in the third client-to-server TLS message flow when mutual authentication is required. Note that with TLS 1.3, the server is able to send encrypted and authenticated application data in its first response message (although, in most uses of TLS 1.3, this feature is not actually used). With KEMTLS, when client authentication is not required, the client is able to send its first encrypted application data after the same number of handshake round trips as in TLS 1.3.
Intuitively, the handshake signature in TLS 1.3 proves possession of the private key corresponding to the public key certified in the TLS 1.3 server certificate. For these signature schemes, this is the straightforward way to prove possession; another way to prove possession is through key exchanges. By carefully considering the key derivation sequence, a server can decrypt any messages sent by the client only if it holds the private key corresponding to the certified public key. Therefore, implicit authentication is fulfilled. It is worth noting that KEMTLS still relies on signatures by certificate authorities to authenticate the long-term KEM keys.
Introducing the In-the-Wild Series
https://googleprojectzero.blogspot.com/2021/01/introducing-in-wild-series.html [googleprojectzero.blogspot.com]
2021-01-13 07:29
tags:
admin
android
browser
exploit
malware
programming
security
series
windows
windows
Leaking silhouettes of cross-origin images
https://blog.mozilla.org/attack-and-defense/2021/01/11/leaking-silhouettes-of-cross-origin-images/ [blog.mozilla.org]
2021-01-13 06:07
tags:
browser
exploit
graphics
security
sidechannel
turtles
web
This is a writeup of a vulnerability I found in Chromium and Firefox that could allow a malicious page to read some parts of an image located on an origin it is not supposed to be able to access. Although technically interesting, it is quite limited in scope—I am not aware of any major websites it could’ve been used against. As of November 17th, 2020, the vulnerability has been fixed in the most recent versions of both browsers.
The time that it takes CanvasRenderingContext2D.drawImage to draw a pixel depends on whether it is fully transparent, opaque, or semi-transparent. By timing a bunch of calls to drawImage, we can reliably infer the transparency of each pixel in a cross-origin image, which is enough to, for example, read text on a transparent background, like this:
source: HN
Stealing Your Private YouTube Videos, One Frame at a Time
https://bugs.xdavidhu.me/google/2021/01/11/stealing-your-private-videos-one-frame-at-a-time/ [bugs.xdavidhu.me]
2021-01-11 19:53
tags:
auth
cloud
investigation
security
web
I quickly Googled “base64 to image”, and pasted the base64 into the first decoder I found, and it displayed a thumbnail from the target Private video! It worked! I have found a working IDOR (Insecure Direct Object Reference) bug, where I could get a frame from any private video on YouTube!
source: HN
Sandboxing and Workload Isolation
https://fly.io/blog/sandboxing-and-workload-isolation/ [fly.io]
2021-01-10 00:19
tags:
defense
development
security
unix
virtualization
Workload isolation makes it harder for a vulnerability in one service to compromise every other part of the platform. It has a long history going back to 1990s qmail, and we generally agree that it’s a good, useful thing.
From chroot to privsep to docker to firecracker.
Data Security on Mobile Devices: Current State of the Art, Open Problems, and Proposed Solutions
http://securephones.io/ [securephones.io]
2020-12-24 21:38
tags:
android
iphone
opsec
paper
security
tech
In this work we attempt a full accounting of the current and historical status of smartphone security measures. We focus on several of the most popular device types, and present a complete description of both the available security mechanisms in these devices, as well as a summary of the known public information on the state-of-the-art in bypass techniques for each. Our goal is to provide a single periodically updated guide that serves to detail the public state of data security in modern smartphones.
source: green