Rolling your own crypto gone wrong: A look at a .NET Branca implementation
This is a pretty good example of code that probably looks decent to a casual inspection, and seems to call functions with the right names, etc., but it’s pretty bad.
Learning from LadderLeak: Is ECDSA Broken?
The paper authors were able to optimize existing attacks exploiting one-bit leakages against 192-bit and 160-bit elliptic curves. They were further able to exploit leakages of less than one bit in the same curves.
We’re used to discrete quantities in computer science, but you can leak less than one bit of information in the case of side-channels.
If “less than one bit” sounds strange, that’s probably our fault for always rounding up to the nearest bit when we express costs in computer science.
Is X25519 Associative? Sometimes!
A Codebreaker's Dream: The Bombe!
What is this, sporting dozens of colorful knobs, almost like a “turn-the-knob” toddler’s game at a playground in a nearest mall? This the awesome British Bombe electro-mechanical codebreaking machine which only had one purpose: to determine the rotor settings on the German cipher machine “ENIGMA” during WW2.
Surrounded by Elligators: Implementing Crypto With Nothing to Compare to
When I first learned about Elligator, I sought the reference implementation so I could get a feel of what was going on. There were none, though. Even SUPERCOP limited itself to a Curve448goldilocks instantiation, there was nothing for Curve25519. Oh well, at least there’s no harm in looking at the paper for now.
And then the murders began.
New Crypto in Go 1.14
Go 1.14 is out and with it come a few nice updates to crypto/tls!
Cryptographic Signatures, Surprising Pitfalls, and LetsEncrypt
In the above attack Eve managed to create a valid public key that validates a given signature and message. This is because, as Andrew Ayer wrote:
A digital signature does not uniquely identify a key or a message
How the CIA used Crypto AG encryption devices to spy on countries for decades
Building Lattice Reduction (LLL) Intuition
The Lenstra–Lenstra–Lovász (LLL) algorithm is an algorithm that efficiently transforms a “bad” basis for a lattice L into a “pretty good” basis for the same lattice. This transformation of a bad basis into a better basis is known as lattice reduction, and it has useful applications. For example, there is attack against ECDSA implementations that leverage biased RNGs that can lead to private key recovery. However, my experience learning why LLL works has been pretty rough. Most material covering LLL seems targeted towards mathematicians and I had to (I guess I wanted to) spend a lot of time trying to weasel out the intuition and mechanics of the algorithm. This blog post is a semi-organized brain dump of that process. My goal is to cover LLL in such a way that slowly ratchets down the hand-waving, so feel free to read until you are happy with your level of understanding.
The Hidden Number Problem
The Hidden Number Problem (HNP) is a problem that poses the question: Are the most signficant bits of a Diffie-Hellman shared key as hard to compute as the entire secret? The original problem was defined in the paper “Hardness of computing the most significant bits of secret keys in Diffie-Hellman and related schemes” by Dan Boneh and Ramarathnam Venkatesan.
In this paper Boneh and Venkatesan demonstrate that a bounded number of most signifcant bits of a shared secret are as hard to compute as the entire secret itself. They also demonstrate an efficient algorithm for recovering secrets given a significant enough bit leakage. This notebook walks through some of the paper and demonstrates some of the results.
What is the random oracle model and why should you care?
About eight years ago I set out to write a very informal piece on a specific cryptographic modeling technique called the “random oracle model”. This was way back in the good old days of 2011, which was a more innocent and gentle era of cryptography. Back then nobody foresaw that all of our standard cryptography would turn out to be riddled with bugs; you didn’t have to be reminded that “crypto means cryptography“. People even used Bitcoin to actually buy things.
That first random oracle post somehow sprouted three sequels, each more ridiculous than the last. I guess at some point I got embarrassed about the whole thing — it’s pretty cheesy, to be honest — so I kind of abandoned it unfinished. And that’s been a major source of regret for me, since I had always planned a fifth, and final post, to cap the whole messy thing off. This was going to be the best of the bunch: the one I wanted to write all along.
The Curious Case of WebCrypto Diffie-Hellman on Firefox - Small Subgroups Key Recovery Attack on DH
Mozilla Firefox prior to version 72 suffers from Small Subgroups Key Recovery Attack on DH in the WebCrypto’s API. The Firefox’s team fixed the issue removing completely support for DH over finite fields (that is not in the WebCrypto standard). If you find this interesting read further below.
Microsoft's Chain of Fools
The BLAKE3 cryptographic hash function
BLAKE3 is based on an optimized instance of the established hash function BLAKE2, and on the original Bao tree mode. The BLAKE3 specifications and design rationale are available in the BLAKE3 paper. The current version of Bao implements verified streaming with BLAKE3.
DECO - A novel privacy-preserving oracle protocol
DECO is a privacy-preserving oracle protocol. Using cryptographic techniques, it lets users prove facts about their web (TLS) sessions to oracles while hiding privacy-sensitive data.
SHA-1 is a Shambles
We have computed the very first chosen-prefix collision for SHA-1. In a nutshell, this means a complete and practical break of the SHA-1 hash function, with dangerous practical implications if you are still using this hash function. To put it in another way: all attacks that are practical on MD5 are now also practical on SHA-1.
Too Much Crypto
We show that many symmetric cryptography primitives would not be less safe with significantly fewer rounds. To support this claim, we review the cryptanalysis progress in the last 20 years, examine the reasons behind the current number of rounds, and analyze the risk of doing fewer rounds. Advocating a rational and scientific approach to round numbers selection, we propose revised number of rounds for AES, BLAKE2, ChaCha, and SHA-3, which offer more consistent security margins across primitives and make them much faster, without increasing the security risk.
A few comments on ‘age’
Age is a new tool for encrypting files, intended to be a more modern successor to PGP/GPG for file encryption. This is a welcome development, as PGP has definitely been showing its age recently. On the face of it, age looks like a good replacement using modern algorithms. But I have a few concerns about its design.
age is a simple, modern and secure file encryption tool.
A simple, modern and secure encryption tool with small explicit keys, no config options, and UNIX-style composability.
I think it’s ready now?
Application Layer Transport Security
Google’s Application Layer Transport Security (ALTS) is a mutual authentication and transport encryption system developed by Google and typically used for securing Remote Procedure Call (RPC) communications within Google’s infrastructure. ALTS is similar in concept to mutually authenticated TLS but has been designed and optimized to meet the needs of Google’s datacenter environments.