Down the Rabbit-Hole...
https://googleprojectzero.blogspot.com/2019/08/down-rabbit-hole.html [googleprojectzero.blogspot.com]
2019-08-13 19:47
I often find it valuable to write simple test cases confirming things work the way I think they do. Sometimes I can’t explain the results, and getting to the bottom of those discrepancies can reveal new research opportunities. This is the story of one of those discrepancies; and the security rabbit-hole it led me down.
Any application, any user - even sandboxed processes - can connect to any CTF session. Clients are expected to report their thread id, process id and HWND, but there is no authentication involved and you can simply lie. Secondly, there is nothing stopping you pretending to be a CTF service and getting other applications - even privileged applications - to connect to you.
Even without bugs, the CTF protocol allows applications to exchange input and read each other’s content. However, there are a lot of protocol bugs that allow taking complete control of almost any other application.
https://github.com/taviso/ctftool
Regarding disclosure: https://bugs.chromium.org/p/project-zero/issues/detail?id=1859#c10