On Ghost Users and Messaging Backdoors
https://blog.cryptographyengineering.com/2018/12/17/on-ghost-users-and-messaging-backdoors/ [blog.cryptographyengineering.com]
2018-12-18 17:31
Which brings us to the real problem with the GCHQ proposal. As far as I can see, there are two likely outcomes. In the first, providers harden their system and kill off the vulnerabilities that make GCHQ’s proposal viable. The more interest that governments express towards the proposal, the faster this will happen. In the second outcome, the UK government (and perhaps other governments) force the providers not to lock them out. This second outcome is what I worry about.
More specifically, today’s systems may include existing flaws that are easy to exploit. But once law enforcement begins to rely on those exploits, the systems can never change or improve. Over time what seems like a “modest proposal” using known flaws could lead us to world in which ancient flaws are preserved, and where agencies like GCHQ become the ultimate architect of Apple and Facebook’s communication systems.
source: green